THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND

REVIEW
JULY, 1893.
RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES$k
BY CHARIE.IS CHAUNCEY-BINNtY, ESQ,

I.
THE TREATMENT OF LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION
IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

THE existence of a right of petition for redress of
grievances is a fundamental principle of the British constitution, and the exercise of this right was in old times a
very necessary supplement to the action of the courts,
whose slow and cumbrous machinery often failed to administer complete justice.2 Complaints of inequitable dealings
between man and man were made to the crown, or crown
in chancery; those concerning violence or oppression, such
I The following is the first of a series of six articles by the same
author on local and special legislation. The importance of the subject,
the confusion which exists in the minds of' the profession concerning it,
and the entire absence from legal literature of all intelligent treatment of
it in detail has appeared to the editors to warrant devoting considerable
space to its critical discussion.-EDs.
"M
Aay's Law and Usage of Parliament, 7th ed., 541.
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as the ordinary courts could: not -or dared not redress,
including abuses of official power, were made to the crown
in council; while petitions for a change in the law were
addressed to Parliament.'
With advancing civilization, as private rights received
better legal protection, especially by the development .of
equitable remedies, petitions for the redress of wrongs
between man and man, or of those inflicted by officers of
the governmeit gradually came to an end, and the aid of
Parliament was sought chiefly for the purpose of obtaining
new and special rights and privileges not granted to the
community in general. Measures introduced for these purposes at the request of persons outside of Parliament gradually came to be known as "private bills," to distinguish
them from those measures of public policy in which the
whole..community were interested, which were regarded as
originating in Parliament itself, and were known as "public bills."
While the difference between private acts and publib
acts, after their passage, was recognized from an-early day,
yet for a long time the subject-matter of a bill was not
strictly regarded in determining whether it should be publik or private, many a.ct being passed as public which
concerned only particulat localities, and not the whole
community. As the volume 'of necessary legislation
increased, parliamentary work became more systematized, so that now among the most important and most
-carefully observed rules for the management of the business
of Parliament are those regulating the passage of private
bills, which include all bills for the particular interest or
benefit of one or more individuals or private corporations,
and even bills for the particular interest or benefit of a
county, city, parish, or other public corporation. As to bills
concerning particular localities, however, it is impossible to
keep the respective fields of private and public legislation
wholly distinct, as such bills always affect the public more
or less. Bills relating to particular cities were indeed at one
I See Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution, Part I,
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time usually held to be private, but the growth of cities in
area and population, and the great increase in the varied
interests which centre in or are connected with them,
necessarily make the affairs of every large city, and of
London especially, a matter of public concern.'
The distinction between public and private bills is not
more clearly recognized than that which marks the functions of Parliament with regard to them. Public bills, as
already stated, are regarded as originating in Parliament
itself, which body conducts, for its own information, such
inquiries as it deems necessary, enacting, amending, -or
rejecting the bills as its judgment may dictate, without
any direct participation of outsiders in the matter; whereas
private bills are recognized as introduced in behalf of persons outside of Parliament, must be advocated by them,
and can be attacked by any persons who may ask to be
heard in opposition to their passage. In the former case
the function of Parliament is purely legislative, while in
the latter it is judicial also, it being necessary to determine
the right to the privileges sought, and to decide between
or adjust the conflicting interests, as in a court of justice ;'
and hence a private bill is treated as a case on trial, the
procedure being as carefully regulated, and as fair a hearing given to both sides, with the same publicity, and
before as impartial judges, as is customary in a court of
law or equity.' As a result of this thoroughly systematized
I May, 670.
2 May, 679; Anson, 239.

3 The method of procedure in regard to private bills maybe summarized as follows:
Private bills must be brought in upon petition, signed by some or all
of the parties who are suitors for them (except that occasionally bills of
a local character are brought in, by order, without the form of a petition),
and every bill and petition must b~e deposited in the private bill office of
that house in which it is proposed to introduce the bill. (May, 670, 709.)
All bills of a local character, including railway bills, are subject to certain standing orders in regard to advertisements, notices to parties affected,
deposit of documents, plans, etc. The fact of compliance with these
standing orders is decided by the "examiners for standing orders," who
sit publicly, examine into each case, hear arguments and testimony in
behalf of unopposed bills and -both for and against all opposed bills,
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method of procedure it may be said, in general, that the.
issues involved in the passage of private bills (which
include all that goes in America by the name of special
legislation, and, to some extent, local legislation also) are
carefully and impartially tried, and that the decisions rendered, and the acts passed in accordance therewith, are
fully up to that high standard of legislative and judicial
work which is expected of every civilized community.
Changes are introduced in the method whenever they are
endorse the decision upon each petition with, in the case of non-compliance, such statement of the facts as may be necessary, and return the
petitions to the private bill office, when their introduction by a member
can be arranged for. May, 69o, el seq.
If the examiner report that the standing orders have not been complied with,.it is still in the power of the House of Commons to dispense
with such compliance after a report by the Standing Orders Committee
upon the facts of the case. Anson, 242.
Every private bill must be solicited by an agent, who enters his
appearance in the private bill office. No member of Parliament can be
an agent, and all agents must be registered and can, in case of misconduct, be prohibited from practicing. May, 702.
Private bills are considered at the times fixed for the "private business list," and hfter the second reading railway and canal bills are referred
to the general committee on such bills, divorce bills to a similar gereral
committee, and other bills to the "committee of selection." Each of
these committees classifies the bills referred to it, and arranges the time
of sitting of the committee who are to consider them, and the bills to be
considered by each. The committee of selection nominates a chairman,
three other members, and a referee, as a committee for each opposed
bill, or for a road bill whether opposed or not, except that the chairmen
of committees on railway and canal bills are nominated by the general
committee on such bills.
Groups of bills similar in character may be referred to one committee.
Unopposed bills (except road bills) are referred to the chairman of the
Committee of Ways and Meang, the member who has been ordered to
bring in the bill, and another member not locally or otherwise interested,
and unopposed railway and canal bills can be similarly referred if the
general committee see fit.
Before these committees sit, all private bills are examined by the
chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means and the speaker's counsel,
whose duty it is to call the attention of the house and of the chairman of
the appropriate committee to all matters in a bill which they think ought
to receive special attention.
They may also introduce amendments
within the scope of the bill, and similar amendments can be introduced
by public departments, like the Board of Trade.
Before a committee on one or more opposed private bills proceeds to
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seen to be required, and the usefulness of the system has
been thoroughly demonstrated. It is true that with the
increase in the number and importance of the imperial
matters that demand the attention of Parliament the time
that is given to the consideration of private and local affairs
can sometimes ill be spared, but the modem tendency is,
unquestionably toward comprehensive general legislation
whenever possible, and the volume of other bills will be
gradually reduced, especially as the machinery of local
government is made more effective.'
The colonial legislatures of America were founded
before the conduct of the business of ParlHinent w-a$ as
thoroughly systematized as it is now, and in the simpler
life of the colonies private affairs assumed a greater proporbusiness, each member must sign a declaration "that his constituents
have no local interest and that he has no personal interest" in the bill
or bills, "and that he will never vote on any question which may arise
without having duly heard and attended to the evidence relating thereto."
If a member subsequently discover that he is in .any way-interested in
any bill before his committee, he must report the fact, and will be discharged from further attendance. It is the duty of all such committees
to hear arguments and testimony for and against all bills -referred to
them, and to make such inquiries as they may deem necessary, before
they make their report to the house, and all the proceedings in regard to
private bills are recorded in thie private bill office, where they are subject to public inspection. Office fees and costs are required to be paid
at the various stages.of the proceedings on a private bill, as court costs
are required to be paid in litigation, and in the case of opposed bills the
costs due to such opposition may be made to fall upon the losing party.
May, 723, et seq. See, as to costs, Williams v. Swansea Can. Nay. Co.,
L. R., 3 Ex., i58; Swansea Can. Proprs. v. G. W. P. Co., L. R., 5 Eq.,
444. The costs of vexatious opposition to a private bill can be summarily recovered in an action of debt. See Mallet v. Hanly, L. R., 18
Q. B. D., 303.
1 "A private act is an exception from the general law; and powers
are sought by its promoters, which cannot be'otherwise exercised, and
which no other authority [than Parliament] is able to confer. It is
obvious, however, that the public laws of a country should be as comprehensive as may be consistent with the rights of private property; and
it has accordingly been the policy of the legislature to enable parties to
avail themselves of the provisions of public acts, adapted to different
classes of objects, instead of requiring them to apply to Parliament for
special powers in each particular case. The same principle may be still
further extended hereafter."
May, 683.
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tionate importance in the mind of the public than they didin England, besides which, the representations being on a
more popular basis, the relations between a colonial legislature and the people were much closer than was the case
with Parliament. To these causes it- is probably due that
in th. legislatures of the colonies and of all the States
until about fifty years ago, public and private, general, special, and. local laws were passed indiscriminately, as is still
the practice in a few States, as well- as to some extent in
Congress. Measures of both kinds, even such as had absolutely no connection with each other, were frequently
"joined in the same bill, becoming law by the same vote,
and by a single signature on the part of the executive. I
What may be called the science of legislation-the careful
adaptation of laws both to the needs of the State and the
vaious classes of people composing it and to the body of
law alfeady existing, .the determination of the proper scope
of -general laws, and of the -circumstances which call for
legislation of a local or special caracter-was too little
regarded, and as time went on not only was the volume of
,special and local legislation needlessly increased, such acts
being frequently passed as to matters that could have been
provided for under. a general system, but .private schemes
were often pushed through the legislatures by .unscrupulous men, to the sacrifice of public interests, each separate
locality was liable to unwise interference in its affairs, and
distracting changes of its governmental system, and the
law, as to many matters, was thrown into confusion.
The natural consequence of all this was the growth of
a very general feeling of hostility to all local and special
legislation.2 One State after another sought, by changes

I

The most striking instance of this in Pennsylvania is the very
important law of 1848, in regard to the rights of married women, its
* provisions forming a part of an act in regard to five different matters,
* including the settlement of the affairs in Le Raysville PhalanF, and the
extension of the boundaries of the borough of Ligonier.
2 See the remarks made over sixty years ago by Gov. Morton, of
Massachusetts, quoted in an article on Special Legislation, 25 Am.
Jurist, 37.
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in its Constitution, to check the excesses into which its
legislature had fallen in this respect, and the influence of
the example so set is seen in the Constitutions of all the
more recently organized States. That some effectual
restrictions upon special legislation were needed has been
repeatedly testified to by the courts of various States when
called upon to enforce these restrictions. Thus, in Indiana,
the earliest State to adopt them, their object was stated as
being "to restote the State from being a coterie of small
independencies, with a body of local laws like so many
counties palatine, to what she should be, and was intended
to be, a unity, governed throughout her borders on all subjects of common interest by the same laws, general and
uniform in their operation.' So in Pennsylvania, which
did not follow the lead of Indiana until 1874, thirty years
after the start had been made, the Supreme Court has
observed: "Prior to the adoption of the present Constitution there was hardly an approach to uniformity in the fees
of public officers through6ut the State: Local acts had
been procured for many of the counties, in some instances'
through the influence of the officers themselves, fixing the.
fees more in harmony with their own greed than the interests of the people, who' may fairly be presumed to have
known nothing of it until they came to pay the fees. It
was to cut this system up, root and branch, with other evils
of like nature, that the clause in question was inserted in
the Constitution. 2 Still more' recently the same court has
said: "During the session of the legislature immediately
preceding the adoption of the present Constitution, nearly
ISo local or special laws were enacted for the city of Philadelphia, more than one-third that number for the city of
Pittsburg, and for other municipal divisions of the State
about the same proportion. This is by no means exceptional. The pernicious system of special legislation, practiced for many years before, had become so general and
deep-rooted, and the evils resulting therefrom so alarming
1Maize v. State, 4 Ind., 342.
2 Morrison

v. Bachert,

112

Pa.,

322, 328.
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that the people of the Commonwealth determined to apply
the only remedy that promised any hope of relief. Doubtless it was a proper appreciation of the magnitude of these
evils as much as anything else that called into existence
the convention that framed the present Constitution, and
induced its adoption by an overwhelming vote. One of
the manifest objects of that instrument was to eradicate
that species of legislation, and substitute in lieu of it general laws whenever it was possible to do so. " 1
Until 1886 no adequate restrictions were imposed upon
special or local legislation in the territories,' and the fact
that the Constitutions of all the States admitted to the
Union in the past thirty years contain provisions more or
less complete as to this, was due to their own experience as
territories. Thus the Supreme Court of Nevada refers to
the practice of the territorial legislature of "passing local
and special laws for the benefit of individuals instead of
enacting laws of a general nature for the benefit of the
public welfare ;" while the Colorado court observes: "It
is a historical fact that prior to the adoption of. the Constitution the jurisdiction and practice of courts of the same
class were often as diverse as if such courts were located in
different States or territories.

.

-.

The Act supersed-

ing indictments, in two counties of the State, in cases of
crimes and misdemeanors not capital, by requinng informations to be filed in such cases, and local acts defining the
jurisdiction and practice of justices of the peace in certain
counties, furnish illustrations of the character of the territorial legislation which had prevailed." '
The foregoing extracts, and many others that might
The restrictions upon local and
1 Ayars' App., 122 Pa., 266, 277.
special legislation were adopted by the Pennsylvania constitutional
convention of 1873, with very little discussion, and it is clear from the
published debates that the delegates considered that in adopting these
restrictions they had performed the chief part of their work.
I This was done by Act of July 30, 1886, 24 U. S. Sts. at Large, c. 8M8,

p. 170.
sEvans v. Job, 8 Nev., 322.
'Expare Stout, 5 Col., 509.

LEGISLATION

IN THE UNITED STATES.

be added,' show a remarkable consensus of judicial opinion
in regard to the evils of unrestricted local and special legislation, and there can be no doubt that it produces the same
results to-day whenever no restrictions or inadequate ones
have been imposed.
The American constitutional restrictions do not, however, attempt to secure the judicial treatment of local and
special legislation. On the contrary, they seem to evince
a belief that legislatures are by nature utterly careless of
the public welfare, if not hopelessly c6rrupt, -- that they
cannot be trusted to deal with this species of legislation,
which must, therefore, be stamped out as far as possible, if not
altogether. To effect this purpose some Constitutions have
forbidden such legislation as to a few subjects, some as to
very many, while others forbid it in every case to which a
general law can be made applicable; regulation of such
laws being wholly confined to the form of their titles, their
containing but one subject, the giving notice before their
passage, etc.
1 See among other cases San Francisco v.S. V. W. W. Co., 48 Cal.,
19 Io., 43; State v. Lawrence Bridge CO., 22
Kan., 438, 456; Pell v.Newark, 40 N. J. L., 71 ; affirmed, id., 550; Cass
V. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 6o7, 617;. Mayor v. Shelton, i Head (Tenn.), 24.
The existence of this unfortunate belief among the members of the
Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1873 was pointed out by one
of the delegates, the late Theodore Cuyler, Esq., who vainly protested
that "we must find some method by which we can secure a pure legislature,
and then entrust them with the large powers which the necessities of the
public interest may demand. We are starting withthe proposition that we
cannot secure a pure legislature, that we must deal with them as if they
were rogues, men who should not be entrusted with power, and framing
our Constitution accordingly." Journal of the Const. Cony., vol. 5,
p. 259.
That special legislation was prohibited as to certain matters in order
to restrict the powerof the legislature's power, and that uniformity in the
practical operation of laws was only a secondary consideration, is the
inevitable inference from the decision in Von Phul v.Hammer, 29 1o.,
222. There a general act allowing any city or town acting under a special charter to amend its charter for itself, was upheld, although a want
of uniformity in city government might result, the restraining clause of
the Constitution not beingregarded as "so far-reaching asto preventsuch
consequences." In other words, as long as the legislature did not itself
promulgate the special form of government adopted, its difference from
those of other cities and towns was immaterial.

438; McGregor v.Baylies,

622

RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL

While the absence of all, restriction upon special and
local legislation is unquestionably a serious evil, yet the
absolute or nearly absolute prohibition produces in its turn
results which are far from satisfactory. That this is
inevitable is clear from the fact that such legislatioh, when
properly regulated and employed, is not only a perfectly
legitimate exercise of legislative power, but is a valuable
means of providing for the needs of the different parts of a
State, and even of corporations or individuals under exceptional circumstances.1 There is nothing essentially wrong
in the thing itself. It is perfectly natural and fitting that
some legislation should be of this character, and what it
needs is to be adequately regulated, as is done in England,
so as to secure its.proper use while preventing its abuse.'
The chief objections to the prohibition.of special and
local legslation are that it interferes with the proper adaptation. of legislation to particular cases, that it is utterly
'The advantage of the power to incorporate by special act, when
properly exercised, may be illustrated by the Massachusetts Act of May
21, 1891, to incorporate the Trustees of Public Reservations.

It incorporates that body-" for the purpose of acquiring, holding, arranging,
maintaining and ofening to the public, under sifitable regulations, beautiful-and historical places and tracts of land" within the State, with power
to acquire and hold re l estate for this putrpbse up to $ioo,ooo in value,
and other property, both real-and personal, up to a like limit, to support
.orpromote the objects of the corporation, all its personal property and
all lands wihich it shall keep open to the public being exempt from taxation. To enable such a corporation to be formed under general laws,
with the same powers and rights, it would be necessary that such laws
should allow of incorporation for such a purpose, should.permit such a
corporation to hold real estate and other property of the value above
mentioned, and should exempt the property of such a corporation from
taxation. Should these laws (as would probably be the case)'not provide
for such incorporation, powers, and exemption, whatever amendments
ittight be made to cover such a case would have to grant the same power
to hold property and the same exemption from taxation to all corporations of the same general class that might at any time be formed, grants
which a legislature might perhaps hesitate to make for all cases, although
their propriety in the particular case might be indisputable.
' Perhaps the recent Massachusetts law in regard to legislative
counsel and agents (Laws of i8go, c. 456; Laws of 1891, c. 223) may be

the beginning of a reform. which will lead up to a system of judicial
treatment of local and special legislation.
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ineffectual as regards those cities and corporations which
differ so greatly from the others in a State as to constitute
a class by themselves, and that it subjects every law to a
needless risk of being at some future time declared unconstitutional for purely technical reasons.
In regard to many matters both of ordinary private
law, that.which affects the everyday relations of life, and
of administrative law as well, the prohibition of special
legislation is both effectual and useful. Thus, the changing
of names, adoption, legitimation, the coming of age,
divorce, citizenship, individual rights, privileges, and liabilities, the rate of interest, liens, civil and criminal procedure,
and other like matters can not only all be regulated by
general laws, but it is vastly better for the community that
in regard to such matters every one's actions should be
controlled by the same law, and that no one should, obtain
from the legislature rights or immunities which enable him
to override the law by -which the rest of the community is
bound. Whether, for instance, a usury law be wise or
unwise, it is clear that as 16ng as it is in force every one in
the State should be bound by it. It is equally important
that courts of the same grade throughout the State should
have the same powers and administer justice in the same"
way, subject, of course, to the right of any court to establish reasonable rules for the transaction of business before
it in matters- not regulated by the legislatures. So a tax
may be wise or unwise, just or unjust, b6ut as long as it is
levied there should be no exception of individuals or localities from it, unless such exception is for the benefit of the
whole community, as in the case of municipal property
and that devoted to public religious and charitable purposes.
Even in these matters, however, the absolute prohibition of special and local legislation may sometimes result
in hardship, 'while in the case of both private and municipal corporations and those quasi corporations which exist
for the purpose of rural government, it is clear that such
prohibition often fails of good results, the distinction between general and special laws being in many instances
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purely a matter of form, while ifl others a special consideration of each particular case is really necessary.
The immediate effect of the prohibition is to prevent

any legislation from being passed directly. and expressly in
regaid to any one or more particular corporations, the
intention of the Constitution being that whatever powers
any-corporation should have for the purpose of its corrorate
-,existence should be granted on the same terms to all

.

similar corporations, but the legislature is allowed to judge
both as to what differences exist between corporations and
.what powers they shall possess. It cannot, however, discriminate between corporations of the same kind. All
railroad companies must have the same powers; all cities
where the same circumstances exist must have the same
form of government; no law can be passed in regard to a
single street or ward in a city. The stop thus put to discrimination is beneficial as far as it goesi but it is not a
complete stop, nor is discrimination the only danger to be
* avoided.
In the case of private corporations what has been
complained of in the practical working of the prohibition is
not the discrimination for or against any corporation or
class of corporations, but rather the excessive liberality in
the grant of corporate powers to all who seek them. It is
undeniable that the corporation laws in force in most of
the States do in their operation give away valuable privileges, for which the community, in whose name they are
granted, receives no adequate consideration, directly or indirectly; that they grant enormous powers with no proper
restriction upon their exercise, and that they often enable
the promoters of companies to acquire wealth while the
risk of the undertaking is borne by the stock or bondholders, and that they expose all owners of real estate to
the risk of having their property taken away or its enjoymen.t greatly impaired, with sometimes very inadequate
compensation, and frequently none at all. As, however,
the right to take, injure, or destroy a man's property exists
for public purposes only, its exercise should obviously be
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restricted to cases where it is essential to the public welfare, and a similar restraint- should be imposed where the
exercise of corporate franchises endangers the rights of the
public, as in regard to highways, streams and rivers, important features of natural scenery, etc.
It is clear that the legislature has the power to
authorize, by a general law, the taking of property for a
public use, provided such taking be, as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment, "by due process of law ;" and it
is probably not worth while to deny that the construction
of a railroad, for the carriage of the persons or goods of all
those who are willing to pay the established rates of transportation, is in every case a public use, whether it be
actually of any real benefit to the community or not. The
public use, which is essential to the exercise of the right of
eminent dor ain, may fairly be taken to mean "utilization," and not necessarily "utility."
There still remains
the condition, however, that the right of eminent domain,
like every other taking of property, be exercised by "due
process of law" only, and it may well be questioned
whether when nine or any other statutory number of men
subscribe to a certain number of shares of stock, pay in a
certain percentage of its par value, execute and file a certificate in a certain form, and receive, as a matter of course,
a charter from the State for the construction of a railroad
between certain points, and then proceed to locate their
line and take property, this constitutes a taking by "due
process of law." Certainly such a proceeding has often
little in common with that "law of the land," which, as
WEBSTER said,' "hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."
The bearing of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the
taking of land by a railroad company incorporated under
a general law'is rather outside the scope of the present
treatise, in which it is intended to discuss exchisively the
actual operation of the restrictions upon special and local
IArgiuendo, Dartmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 518,
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legislation in the light of the decisions rendered in regard
to- them. It is impossible, however, to overlook in this
connection the maxim, "Nemo debet esse judex in tirotria
*ua azusa," and the anomaly that under the system of
*general legislation prevailing in most of our States, those
to whom is granted the right of eminent domain or other
rights which necessarily conflict with those of individuals
or the public, are made in almost all cases the sole judges
of when, where, and how their rights and powers shall be
exercised.
In the case of railroad, telegraph, pipe-line and other
companies whose business necessitates a right of a way, or
the use of the power of eminent domain, the legislature
cannot, by any system of general laws, directly intervene
for the protection of individual rights or those of the
public. Such direct intervention can only be secured by a
system of special legislation based upon a judicial treatment
of each case. The same result might also be attained
.indirectly by general laws providing that all grants of corporate power should be subject to the approval of some
-properly-constituted public authority, so that no railroad
line, for instance, could be begun until the location had
been approved after a thorough investigation into the
advisability of the line proposed and a fair hearing of all
the parties opposed to it. Every law, whether general or
special, should protect public and private rights from unjust
and unnecessary infringement. So long as this *protection
is afforded by a proper judicial inquiry in every instance, it
is immaterial whether this be made by a committee of the
legislature or by any other responsible body.
In the case of municipal corporations and rural local

government also, the prohibition of special legislation
work! fairly well in the great majority of instances. Most
cities, and probably all boroughs, villages, towns, counties,
1 This has been done to some extent in regard to elevated railroads
in the city of New York. See Matter of N. Y. Elevated Ry. Co., 70
N. Y., 327, where the court said: 'The legislature cannot in a general
law determine the necessity of a railroad in any particular locality, or its
route, but it may provide the machinery for such determination."
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etc., can, for the purpose of their government, be grouped
into a few-classes, the members of which do not differ
greatly from each other in size or other distinctive characteristics, so that a law for one class can reasonably be
expected to work equally well for every member of the
class; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in
every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than
the mere fact that the law is general. The number of
places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the
enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place
only. If such a law be against the interest of the other
communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and
thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented.
In every State, however, there are cities which differ
so widely from others that they must be classed by themselves, and a law for a class which though theoretically
capable of enlargement actually contains but one or two
members, is practically a special or local law, even if it be
legally general. In such cases the prohibition is to a great
degree inoperative, and, as regards all strictly municipal
matters which concern the whole city, special legislation
goes on as before, and with the same results. The legislature cannot indeed order the paving of a particular street
or in other ways legislate directly for special parts of the
city, but it can create and abolish particular offices, direct
how the clerks in any special city department shall be
appointed, and in many ways regulate the affairs of a single
city just as if no prohibition of special legislation existed.'
I

See Mr. Oberholtzer's article, "Home

Rule for Our American

Cities," 3 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 736. The struggle by which an act for an improved form of
government for Philadelphia, masked under the title of "cities of the
first class," was wrung from an unwilling legislature in 1885 (Act of
June 1, 1885, Purd. Dig. Supp., 2281-2291), and the readiness with which
the Pennsylvania Legislature of 1887 (Act of April 6, 1887, Purd. Dig.
Supp., 2288, pl. 91), all protests of citizens to the contrary notwithstanding, struck out the Civil Service Reform provisions of the same act in
the case of two important city offices, prove conclusively that even if
minor municipal details have been placed outside the legislative sphere,
the power of the legislature over the city government is still absolute as
to all important matters, and is exercised without any proper regulation.
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In the same way, where there are but one or avery
few private corporations of a certain sort, general laws for
suxch corporations are practically special, because they affect, only a very limited number, and the passage of such
laws is advocated or opposed by the parties to be affected,
lreisely,as if they were named in the bills.
It can hardly be denied that all measures in regard to
local government or the regulation of local affairs, as well
as tho~e which grant or regulate corporate power, should
be treated judicially by the legislatures that enact them.
That no such judicial treatment is required in America
*produces results in regard to legislation that are analogous
to what would happen in the administration of justice were
our courts of law under no obligation to deal judicially
with the matters that come before them. The experience
of England shows that the power of special legislation,
when exercised judicially, is not a menace to good-government, and there is no reason why this judicial method
should'not be extended even beyond the limits usual in
iEngland; and applied to all legislation affecting the affairs
of municipal corporations and quasi corporations.
In a few States, however, a remedy for unwise special
legislation has been sought by constitutional provisions,
authorizing cities of a certain size to frame charters for
themselves, and to adopt the same, or amendments thereto,
by popular vote, in the same. manner in which a State constitution is framed and adopted or amended, and after the
adoption of such a charter the legislature has no further
control over the city government.'
I Const. Cal., Art. XI, 8; Const. Mo., Art. IX, 16; Const. Wash.
'At. XI, io. In Calif6rnia such charter or amendment must still come
before. the legislature for adoption or rejection, but cannot be altered
by it. See Mr. Oberholtzer's article, ut supra. This form of "home
rule" certainly accords with -the idea of representative government,
which is, properly, government by those who, in whatever capacity
they serve, are elected to represent the people who are affected by
To entrust a legislature with
the acts done or measures adopted.
power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the
majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent,
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In St. Louis, Mo., and the few other cities which have
obtained local self-government by this method, the results
are reported to be very satisfactory, and it is claimed that
the,way has been opened to a removal of the very serious
abuses that have long disgraced American municipal government. Local self-government of this kind is still in
the experiment~.l stage, however. Should it prove thoroughly successful, and become generally established, all
State legislation for municipalities would come to an end,
but as long as such legislation is possible, provision should
be made for some systematic and judicial method of deal- "
ing. with it, whether the form of general legislation be
retained or not.
The above remarks in regard to legislation concerning
public and private corporations illustrate the first two
objections already mentioned, that the prohibition of special legislation prevents, as to some matters, the proper
adaptation of legislation to the subjects regulated by it,
while as to other matters the prohibition fails of its effect.
The third objection concerns-the difficulty of securing really .
general legislation, and the consequent uncertainty as to
the constitutionality of many statutes.
The boundary between general laws and special or.
local laws, often seems shadowy and indefinite,, and the
prohibition of the latter has resulted in a species of conflict
between courts and legislatures, r~ndering the validity of
statutes and of rights acquired under them uncertain and
hnstable. Whether such a"result could be wholly avoided
is another question. Certainly the distinctions between
general and special legislation would be better understood
were they more thoroughly studied. The legislatures
indeed do not seem to have taken any great pains to exam,
ine into these distinctions, both because our legislative
methods make careful work almost impossible, and because
and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the
officers of a city should b e appointed by the State executive would
not be mpre at variance with the representative principle.
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in many cases the legislatures have evidently desired to use
the form of a general law merely as a cloak for legislation
intended to secure special ends. In New York especially,
where the requirement that a law shall relate to but one
subject, which must be expressed in its title, is confined to
local and private acts, the temptation to palm off such acts
as general is of the strongest character. The result has
been the enactment of a great deal of legislation which
the courts have held to be unconstitutional, and of a
great deal besides, which, as was recently pointed out by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,1 cannot stand the test
of the constitutional restrictions if rationally applied,
and only awaits the, adverse decision of a court of last
resort, which sooner or later is sure to overtake it.
The number of statutes declared unconstitutional by
Teason of their violating the prohibitions of special legis.
latian is, however, too great to be accounted for by mere
legislative recklessness. It is probable that in some
cases the very desire of the framers of the law to make it
as effectual as possible without interfering with matter
which, though similar to those treated of, did not need the
remedy proposed, led to -the introduction of special provisions which a court has felt compelled to overthrow.
Even the courts of the different States often differ in their
construction of constitutional prohibitions couched in the
same language, and it is not to be wondered at if courts
and legislatures have similarly differed, even when neither
body can be charged with hasfy and ill-consiatered action.
-The possibility of such differences is- one of the defects
inherent in the system of prohibiting local and special
legislation, .and, while it is likely to diminish as time goes
on, its existence cannot be denied.

Probably the best solution of the problem of how to
deal with special legislation would be a resort to both prohibition and regulation. There are unquestionably many
matters that can best be dealt with by general laws, operating uniformly throughout the State, while there are others
I Morrison v. Bachert,

112 Pa., 322, 328.
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which, to secure the best results, require a more special
treatment. As to the former special legislation could be
forbidden, while as to the latter it could, be permitted
under such regulations as would ensure a fair and judicial
treatment of each case.
The policy of prohibiting special legislation is not
recognized in equal measure in the various State constitutions, as is seen by their differing provisions. More thah
this, in some cases where the language of different constitutions is identical or nearly so, it has not received the
same judicial interpretation everywhere. The conflicting
decisions do not necessarily indicate -different views of one
principle or doctrine of law, but merely that the courts of
each State have had to decide what the framers of their
own constitution meant, and that this meaning has
depended upon local circumstances. The most conspicuous instan'ce of such diversity of interpretation of the same
language occurring in different constitutions is probably
that of legislation affecting the affairs of cities, counties,
townships, etc. In Pennsylvania it is held that there must
be one system of government for all cities of the same
class,I while in New Jersey there may be many systems as,
to one or many particulars, and each city may choose the
system it prefers,' yet in both States the restrictions are
practically the same. This matter will be more fully dwelt
upon in discussing legislation in regard to local government; it is referred to now in order to point out at the
start that *hile it may be theoretically possible to develop
a .uniform- system of general legislation applicable everywhere, yet as the fundamental law of each State in the
Union is a separate instrument, the outgrowth of conditions
often widely differing in the different States, -nosuch uniform system exists now, nor could it ever exist except by
common consent, and as the result of many changes in
I Scranton School Dist.'s App., 113 Pa., 178; Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 137 id., 389; Same v. Denworth, 145 id., 172.
2 Paul v. Gloucester Co., 5o N. J. L., 585; Warner v. Hoagland, ,i
id., 66; In re Cleveland, 52 id., 188.

